HVDC tests were performed to establish parameters and techniques to safely hotline high pressure wash insulator strings on BPA's section of the DC Intertie, energized at+ 500 kV. Parameters investigated included nozzle distance from the conductor, water pressure, nozzle orifice, water resistivity, and washing technique.
INTRODUCTION
The BPA Direct Current Intertie was initially designed in 1968, for 800 kV, bipolar 400 kV, dc line operation. The number of suspension insulators used was varied from 18 to 22 units, based on elevation of the line section. The line operating voltage was uprated to 1000 kV, bipolar 500 kV, in 1985, with very little of the original insulation replaced.
Where insulation was replaced, glass suspension insulators were replaced with silicone rubber nonceramic insulators with the same vertical drop length.
In December of 1990, during a rain storm, one section of the line insulation flashed over due to contamination at all voltages above 266 kV bipolar. Line crews reported strings of 20-each glass insulators from Miles 206 through 211 had visible arcing. They also reported that nonceramic insulators in the adjacent section ahead on line (AHOL) had no visible scintillation activity and no flashovers.
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The contamination levels (ESDD), measured on the nonceramic insulators were found to be 0.1224 mg/cm2 on the normally negative pole and 0.1 124 mg/cm2 on the normally positive pole. These contamination levels were about six times the design level for this line. The measured area weighted average value on the glass insulators was 0.0722 mg/ cm2; 0.0053 on the rain washed caps and 0.112 mg/cm2 on the underskirts. These contamination levels were the result of an extended period of drought and were about 10 times the levels measured at any previous time period since the uprate to 500-kV bipolar.
The BPA Transmission Line Maintenance Organizations decided to correct this contamination problem by replacing as many ceramic insulators as was possible with the existing stocks of NCI's and to wash the remaining strings. The washing of the ceramic insulation was to be done hot at normal line voltage o f f 5 0 0 kV or at a reduced line voltage of f 4 0 0 kV. The replacement of glass insulation in locations with high flashover numbers by nonceramic insulators was also to be done hot. Each of these proposed practices required testing by the BPA Electrical Laboratories to ensure that this work could be done without risk to personnel or line operation.
DEVELOPMENT OF BPA HOT LINE DIRECT CURRENT WASHING
TECHNIOUE
In th m i d -1 9 6 0 '~~ the BPA Laboratories worked closely with Los Angeles Departm t of Water and Power (LADWAP) to investigate the possibilities of hotline washing direct current lines and substations. The practice did not prove to be required on the BPA facilities, but did prove necessary on the Los Angeles end of the Pacific NorthwestSouthwest DC Intertie. However, with the replacement of ceramic with nonceramic insulators on the south end of the Intertie, the numbers of transmission line towers where washing was still needed had been reduced. Thus, it was possible for BPA to lease a hotline washing truck from LADWAP and for some BPA Maintenance personnel to observe the washing technique and communications practices in use at LADWAP.
Testing at the BPA Direct Current Laboratories was to determine the personnel safety factors related to hotline washing at a distance of 14 feet minimum spacing from the nozzle to the conductor with each pole of the line energized to 500 kV line to ground and to prove that strings of 20-each insulators contaminated to ESDD levels in excess of 0.1 mg/cm2 could be washed without causing flashovers. The Maintenance Organizations provided the initial criteria, which were as follows: Prior to allowing a man-operated test of the washing apparatus, the nozzle to conductor airgap HVDC flashover was established with the nozzle discharging at rated pressure. During this test, the nozzle was moved in 1 foot increments, starting at 10 feet until a flashover occurred. At 550 kV, the water stream did not initiate a flashover until the gap was between 3 and 4 feet.
The leakage current through the water stream was then measured for gaps of 4 t o 10 feet,
with the voltage at -500 kV. The water resistivity was 52,000 ohm-cm during this test.
GAP-Feet Cu rrent-mA
10 -feet 5.7
8 -feet 7.9
5 -feet 14.5 4 -feet 21.7
From this data it was determined that the threshold of perception current of 3.5 mA dc and the maximum safe-let-go current of 41 mA were highly unlikely to be encountered. To reduce the risk, it was decided that before water could be turned on, the nozzle had to be grounded to the tower.
Washing Contaminated Insulators
Hotline washing artificially contaminated insulators was demonstrated first by applying a Kaolin and salt spray with alcohol, to ESDD levels of about 0.1 mg/cm2. This proved to be as much art a s science. (At these contamination levels, and with a light wetting by rain, the insulators duplicated the intertie line operation by flashing over before hotline washing could be attempted.) After spraying, the insulator top surfaces were wiped using water-soaked rags. This yielded contaminant distributions which closely resembled those measured on the Intertie Line after the first flashovers.
Washing was initiated at the energized 500-kV conductor end of the assembly, and the water was directed to strike only the bottom 3 to 4 bells in the string of 20. Attempts to wash sections larger than about 30 percent of the string, starting at the base, resulted in immediate flashover. Successful washing occurred only when the water was directed upwards for only about the next three bells, with repeated rewashing of the prior washed end of the assembly until the entire assembly was washed. At 400 kV, all washing attempts for both polarities were successful, but leakage currents in excess of 200 milliamperes were measured from the 20-bell assembly to the tower, and the visual scintillation activity was substantial. At 500 kV, attempts to wash the negative pole caused flashovers much more easily than on the positive pole. But if the procedure was carefully followed and not rushed, it was demonstrated that hotline washing could be accomplished with safety to the personnel at 400 and 500 kV, even with the contamination at levels where flashover could be expected.
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Following these tests, the BPA Transmission Line Maintenance crews successfully hotline washed 60 miles of the Intertie Line (over 300 towers). Cleaning was required several additional times during the following drought months. A hotline washing apparatus was subsequently purchased and will be used as necessary in the future.
IMPULSE TESTS FOR HVDC INTERTIE HOT-LINE INSULATOR CHANGE-OUT
4.1
Hz Hieh Pot Tests
When it was decided to determine if ceramic insulators could be safely replaced with NCI's at +500 kV, the first concern to be addressed was the fact that none of the NCI's had ever been energized at high voltage and could theoretically have an internal flaw. To address this concern, it was decided that BPA would subject all NCI's to an overvoltage test in its 60 Hz Laboratory and then wrap them individually in a plastic bag before releasing them to the line crews for hotline change-out. For the insulators used on the Intertie this test was performed at 600 kV rms.
Impulse Tests
The second concern was the fact that BPA had only developed and demonstrated procedures for replacing insulators at +400 kV, and only for ceramic insulator strings. The safety of doing this work at +500 kV had to be demonstrated before work could begin. During hotline change-out there are many and varied insulating tools and ropes in addition to the old and new insulators in the air gap between the conductor and the tower crossarm and the conductor and the tower body. Further, in the worst case analysis, the voltage is no longer a steady state dc voltage, but a switching surge voltage, which studies have shown to be as high as a 900 kV. The purpose of these laboratory tests was to ensure that hotline change-out could be performed safely. In particular, the tests were to determine if the withstand voltage of the tower airgaps would be too low for working while energized during any step in the change-out. The withstand voltage minimum should not be less than the assumed maximum switching surge of 900 kV. This corresponds to a 50-percent flashover voltage of 1060 kV, assuming a 5-percent standard deviation.
The DC Intertie Line Tower was simulated and a set of hotline tools to be used by the line crew assigned to do this work was provided. Representatives of the tasked line crew were on hand to supervise and assist with the proper installation of these tools.
The following steps in the change-out procedure were then subjected to standard switching impulse tests:
Twenty glass insulators in normal position; Conductor supported by hot sticks, glass insulators hanging by handline; Conductor supported by hotsticks, insulators removed; Conductor supported by hotsticks, NCI hanging by handline; Nonceramic insulator in final installed position.
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Included in the above setups were vertical suspension hot sticks, two horizontal hotsticks, a handline used to raise and lower insulators, an insulated hook ladder, and a 4-foot water resistor mounted at the lower end of the ladder to simulate a worker. The 50-percent flashover voltage and the path of all flashover arcs were recorded for each step.
As a follow-up to these investigations, another series of switching impulse tests were performed to determine how much the gap strength could be reduced by the existence of broken insulators in the glass assembly being changed out. Both the number and location of the broken insulators proved to be significant. As in the first test series, a full set of hotline tools was placed in the gap with the assembly containing broken insulators. (Being glass, broken insulators consisted only of the metal hubs with a small area of fractured glass between the cap and pin sections.)
Hotline Tools
The DC Intertie Line tower simulation provided a conductor to tower vertical gap of 13 feet. This vertical ground plane was approximately 9 feet wide. An Intertie line suspension clamp assembly was used to support two each 2-inch diameters aluminum pipes to simulate the normal conductor assembly.
Two vertical adjustable hotsticks (2-inch diameter by 12-feet long) were attached to support the conductor, using a fixed yoke placed under the conductor suspension assembly at the bottom end, and with a screw jack yoke mounted on the tower crossarm at the upper end. An 18-feet insulated ladder was hung from the tower crossarm, 10 feet from the insulator assembly. During the testing, this 10-feet gap was later increased to 11 feet and decreased to 8 feet. Two horizontal hotsticks (1.5-inch diameter by 16-feet long) were strapped from the conductor to the insulated ladder. A 4-feet tall, 500-ohm water resistor was strapped to the bottom of the ladder to simulate a worker. A hotline rope handline was suspended from the tower about 25 inches from the insulators.
Switchin? Impulse Voltage Test Procedu re
All tests were performed using the 30-shot up and down test procedure. The applied voltage was a 180 x 2200 ps impulse waveshape of positive polarity. From this data, the 50-percent flashover voltage was determined, and then corrected for atmospheric conditions according to IEEE Std. 4-1978 .
Impulse Test Results
AS can be seen in Table' s I and 11, all the 50-percent flashover voltages are at least 125 percent of the minimum acceptable voltage (1060 kV) for hotline insulator change-out work to be allowed. The 50-percent flashover voltage for the tower without tools was reduced from 1480 kV for the 20 glass insulators, to 1340 kV for the nonceramic insulator.
This reduction was expected, as the assembly drop length was not increased, and the NCI required protective metal rings on both the upper and lower ends shortened the strike
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distance. When the insulators were disconnected from the crossarm and the conductor and supported by the handline, the 50-percent flashover voltage actually increased about 4 percent.
One of the most variable results was the position of the arc at flashover. Placement of the ladder and sticks into the gaps tended to increase the number of arcs which were horizontal. Many but not all of these horizontal arcs came into contact with the water resistor simulation of a worker at the bottom of the ladder. Arcs to the top of the ladder normally terminated on the metal hooks attached to the crossarm. Vertical flashovers to the crossarm normally contacted the crossarm at distances up to several feet away from the insulator assembly attachment point. These results substantiated the need to perform hotline change-out only when test results show it can be done with electrical safety factors adequate to protect the workers. Movement of the ladder position test results are provided in Table 11 . The change in arc location is more significant than the change in flashover voltage levels.
BROKEN INSULATORS REDUCE THE SAFETY FACTORS
Having broken glass insulators in the assembly to be replaced REDUCES the safety factors associated with this work. The worst case under which hotline change-out will be allowed is the loss of the lower four insulators (in an assembly of 20), the four insulators adjacent to the conductor suspension clamp assembly. With these four insulators broken, the 50-percent flashover was reduced to 1120 kV and the calculated withstand to 950 kV. This still exceeds the maximum switching surge level of 900 kV.
Having broken insulators in other positions in the assembly does not cause the switching impulse voltage to be so substantially reduced, as can be seen in Figure 1 .
SUMMARY
From these laboratory tests it was demonstrated that the in-service ceramic insulation could be SAFELY hotline washed at operating voltages of 800 kV to 1000 kV dc, even with levels of contamination likely to cause flashovers. This was later substantiated by many months of work by the Transmission Line Crews. Further, it was noted that the inplace ceramic insulation could be SAFELY hotline replaced with nonceramic insulation using existing tools and accepted work practices. This work was also demonstrated by actual hotline replacement.
The weather patterns which required these reviews and substantially increased work effort are not an annual event. Past records suggest that these severe drought conditions and resulting high contamination levels will occur at about 15 to 20 year intervals. A similar cycle occurred in 1976-77, when this line was being operated at 800 kV. 
